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While
Napster has been grabbing most of the headlines, another music copyright issue lurks on the
Internet: do radio stations who simultaneously "stream"
or "webcast" their programming owe "digital performance" royalties to the owners of the recordings they play?
In a recent rulemaking, the Copyright Office decided
that FCC-licensed radio stations must obtain a license

After the 1976 Act, Congress did not take any further action for over two decades. Despite vigorous lobbying from the recording industry, Congress simply
refused to create a public performance copyright in
sound recordings.
The oft-stated rationale for this
refusal was that broadcasters' performances of sound
recordings provided exposure to artists and their recordings, thereby boosting record sales. 5 In Congress' view,

from sound recording copyright holders if the stations
intend to stream their AM/FM signals over the Internet.

making broadcasters liable under a new performance

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and certain broadcasters have filed suit to challenge the new
rule. To be sure, there are valid statutory construction

ing industry. As other commentators have noted:
The history of copyright protection for sound

On the
arguments that support the Office's decision.
other hand, those arguments seem to go against the

theme: Congress repeatedly took pains to
ensure that the grant of copyright protection
did not affect the symbiotic relationship

grain of Congress' overall intent in creating the digital
performance right in sound recordings-a right that was
conferred in only the most crabbed and excruciatingly
defined terms. Congress did not grant a simple, broad
performance right; it attempted to calibrate the rights
and interests of the various players, old and new.
Moreover, Congress' long-standing policy has been to
strike a careful balance between the interests of broad-

right would be an unwarranted windfall for the record-

recordings reflects a dominant, recurring

between the radio broadcasters and the record
industry. Congress recognized both that the
record industry reaps huge benefits from the
public performance of their recordings by
radio stations, and that the granting of a public performance right could alter that relation6
ship to the detriment of both industries.

row, Byzantine terms of the digital performance right
were intended to mark a 180-degree reversal of that his-

Enter the Digital Age. "In 1990, digital audio services
began transmitting sound recordings in the United
States."7 Congress saw these digital audio serviceswhich transmitted specific recordings directly to sub-

torical position.

scribers' homes, generally without commercial interrup-

casters and the recording industry to avoid a windfall for
the latter. It takes quite a leap to assume that the nar-

tion-as a possible substitute for recorded music that
HISTORY OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN
SOUND RECORDINGS
Prior to 1971, U.S. copyright law did not recognize any
copyright whatsoever in sound recordings.

As a matter

of fact, "[i]n the 1920s and for five decades following,
[whenever] Congress . . . considered whether to grant
any copyright rights in sound recordings . . . [it] repeat1

edly rejected those proposals." That changed somewhat
with the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971,2 where
Congress provisionally created a limited copyright in
reproductions of sound recordings and the distribution
thereof. But the amendment made clear that it was not
conferring a public performance right.
became
enactment
provisional
Congressional sentiment regarding

Even once the
permanent, 3
such

a

right

remained obvious, as "Congress again decided not to
grant a sound recording public performance right during
the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in
1976."4

could potentially damage the recording industry's market.8 Thus, in 1995, it enacted the Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA), 9 giving owners
of sound recordings the exclusive right of public performance by means of certain digital audio transmissions. Like the 1971 amendment, however, the DPRA
was limited and narrowly tailored to meet specific technological advances.
The limited right created by this legislation
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reflects changed circumstances-that is, the

form, streaming only necessarily gives the user the

commercial exploitation of new technologies
in ways that may change the way prerecorded
music is distributed to the consuming pub-

opportunity to access digital audio as it is being offered
by some outside source-much like listening to the radio.
In that light,

lic. It is the intent of this legislation to provide copyright holders of sound recordings
with the ability to control the distribution
of their product by digital transmissions,
without hampering the arrival of new
technologies, and without imposing new

While downloading allows a user to
it is unsurretain and repeatedly access a digital copy of prising that
an audio clip-much like having a CD and the DPRA's
playing tracks on cue-in its basic form, "n a r r o w 1y
streaming only necessarily gives the user the framed peropportunity to access digital audio as it is fo r m a n c e

in
and unreasonable burdens on radio and being offered by some outside source--much right
like listesig to the radio.
s o u n d
television broadcasters, which often prorecordings
mote, and appear to pose no threat to, the
10
only occurred when the evolution of digital transmission
distribution of sound recordings.
The DPRA thus "addressed the concerns of record producers and performers regarding the effects that new
digital technology and distribution systems might have
on their core business without upsetting the longstanding business and contractual relationships among record
producers and performers, music composers and publishers and broadcasters that have served all of these
11
industries well for decades."
Of course, none of those concerns necessarily implicated "streaming." Streaming itself did not motivate
enactment of the DPRA, but rather the prospect that
consumers would be able to download and copy music
from on-line services. To see why, one must first understand the difference between the two technologies. As
one court recently explained:
Streaming is to be contrasted with "downloading," a process by which a complete copy of an
audio or video clip is delivered to and stored
on a consumer's computer. Once a consumer
has downloaded a file, he or she can access the
file at will, and can generally redistribute
copies of that file to others ...In the digital
era, the difference between streaming and
downloading is of critical importance. A downloaded copy of a digital audio or video file is

technologies raised concerns that interactive and subscription digital transmissions could evolve in a way that
might directly displace record sales" 13 -in other words,
when streaming began to be conducted in such a manner
that it resembled downloading.
Ginsburg has observed:

As Professor Jane

Although the 1995 amendments were titled
'digital performance right in sound recordings,' the text suggests that Congress was at
least as concerned with protecting sound
recording copyright owners' reproduction
rights as with instituting a public performance right. The structure of the amendments
addressed a spectrum of digital performances,
from those resembling traditional radio broadcasts, to the 'celestial jukebox' model of music
on demand. While the former remained outside the sound recording copyright, the more
the content of a digital transmission depended
on a particular recording or artist, or could be
known by the user in advance, the more subject it became to the sound recording copyright. This is because the more advance information the user has about the digital transmission, the more the transmission facilitates

the touch of a button. A user who obtains a

a user's private copying (in perfect digital
copies) of the recorded performance, or, at
least, enables the user to substitute listening

digital copy may supplant the market for the
original by distributing copies of his or her

to the targeted performance for purchasing a
14
copy of it.

essentially indistinguishable from the original, and such copies can often be created at

own.

12

Thus, while downloading allows a user to retain and
repeatedly access a digital copy of an audio clip-much
like having a CD and playing tracks on cue-in its basic

The primary reflection of this motivation lies in the
"carefully calibrated, three-tiered approach to the new
digital performance right" seen in the DPRA. 15 The first
tier addresses "[t]hose transmissions perceived to have

the highest potential to replace sales, such as those
engaged in by 'interactive' services, [making them] subject to discretionary licenses from the individual rights
holders."1 6 In the "middle category" are certain "noninteractive, subscription digital transmissions" which
are "subject to a statutory license, which compel[s] individual copyright owners to grant permission, upon
request," for eligible transmissions. 17
The Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel can arbitrate what is a "reasonable royalty" for this compulsory license.1 8 The last
tier involves transmissions totally exempted from the
new performance right, "principally because such transmissions were viewed as posing little or no threat to
replace sales of sound recordings."1 9 As will be discussed
in detail below, this final category of exempt transmissions lies at issue in the Copyright Office rulemaking.
THE STATUTORY TEXT
The Copyright Act defines a "digital transmission" as
a "transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other
non-analog format. '20 A "digital audio transmission" is a
"digital transmission.., that embodies the transmission
of a sound recording." 2 1 To create the digital performance right, the DPRA amended Copyright Act §106.
That section now provides, "[s]ubject to sections 107
through 121, the owner of copyright under [the Act] has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

.

.. (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform

the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
22

transmission."
Section 114, however, limits "the exclusive rights of

sion . .. 24
A "broadcast transmission" is defined as "a transmission made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as
such by the Federal Communications Commission." 2 5 If
the digital audio transmission is not exempt under section 114(d)(1), is "an eligible nonsubscription transmission," and is "not part of an interactive service," it is subject to statutory licensing. 2 6 Section 114(f) sets forth the
terms of the statutory license. In the end, "Section 114
treats the public performance of sound recordings by digital audio transmissions in one of three ways: the performance is either exempt from copyright liability, subject to copyright owners' exclusive rights, or subject to
27
statutory licensing."
Two subsequent actions regarding the operation of
section 114 require mention. First, in 1998, Congress
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
The DMCA made certain amendments to section 114
that subjected Internet-only webcasters to the statutory
licensing provisions. However, the DMCA did not alter
the DPRA's three-tiered approach to the performance
right, and retained the exemption for "nonsubscription
28
broadcast transmissions."
Secondly, the Copyright Office has issued regulations
prescribing the "rules under which copyright owners
shall receive initial notice of use of their sound recordings under statutory license under section 114(f).,,29 On
December 11, 2000, the Copyright Office issued its Final
Rule with respect to the definition of a "Service" that
30
would have to obtain a section 114(f) statutory license.
The new regulation reads:

the owner of copyright in a sound recording."2 3 More
specifically, section 114(d)(1), the operative provision for
purposes of this discussion, sets forth the exemptions
from the new section 106(6) exclusive right to perform

A Service is an entity engaged in the digital
transmission of sound recordings, pursuant to

sound recordings publicly "by means of a digital audio
transmission." Subsection (d)(1)(A) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section

entity that transmits an AM/FM broadcast
signal over a digital communications network
such as the Internet, regardless of whether
the transmission is made by the broadcaster

106(6)

-

(1) Exempt transmissions and retransmis-

section 114(f) of title 17 of the United States
Code, and includes, without limitation, any

that originates the AM/FM signal or by a third
party, provided that such transmission meets

sions. - The performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive

In other words, the Final Rule found the "nonsub-

service, is not an infringement of section
106(6) if the performance is part of -

scription broadcast transmissions" exemption applied
only to radio signals, and did not include a broadcaster's

(A) a nonsubscription broadcast transmis-

simultaneous transmission of that signal over the
Internet.

the applicable requirements of the statutory
31
license set forth in 17 U.S.C. 114(d)(2).
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nition is the designation of the nature of the entity making the transmission-not the method of the transmisIn other words, the fact that an FCC-licensed
sion.

THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE PROCEEDINGS
The Final Rule was issued, upon the petition of the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), in
order to "clarify that transmissions of a broadcast signal
over a digital communications network, such as the

broadcast station makes the transmission is dispositive."3 7 As the broadcasters stated in the rulemaking:
In creating a safe harbor for radio broadcasts,
Congress identified key factors that "place[d]

Internet, are not exempt from copyright liability under
section 114(d)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act."' 32 But clarifi-

such programming beyond the concerns that
animated the creation of the limited public
performance right in sound recordings in

cation may have been the last thing it provided. Firstly,
as commentators have noted, this conclusion hardly
flows ineluctably from the text or history of the legislation. Secondly, "[d]espite the DMCA's intricate structure

Section 106(6). Specifically, radio programs
that (1) are available without subscription; (2)
do not rely upon interactive delivery; (3) provide a mix of entertainment and non-enter-

and language, there are some apparent ambiguities in
the statute. One issue that remains unclear is whether
traditional radio stations that simultaneously stream
their signal on the Web must obtain the statutory license
33
for their webcasting activities."

tainment programming and other public
interest activities to local communities to ful-

operations of traditional broadcast radio stations . . .is

fill FCC licensing conditions; (4) promote,
rather than replace, record sales; and (5) do
not constitute 'multichannel offerings of various music formats."' 38

perhaps the thorniest problem engendered by the new
statute."3 4 In the rulemaking, the broadcasters took the
position that "any transmission made by an
FCC-licensed broadcaster, whether made over-the-air or

The RIAA, on the other hand, focused on the section
1140)(3) definition of a "broadcast transmission" as "a
transmission made by a terrestrial broadcast station
licensed as such by the Federal Communications

over the Internet, falls within the scope of the section
114(d)(1)(A) exemption." The RIAA and other copyrightowner representatives 3 5 argued that "transmission of a

Commission." 39 They argued that "use of the word 'terrestrial' limits the exemption to over-the-air transmissions made by a broadcast station." 40 According to the

In fact, this "lack of clarity" regarding the "applicability of the new licensing provisions to the webcasting

RIAA:
The focus here is on the nature of the transmission and not the characterization of the
entity making the transmission. From this

The Final Rule was issued,
upon the petition of the Recording
Industry Association of America
(RIAA), in order to "clarify that transmissions of a broadcast signal over a
digital communications network,
such as the Internet, are not exempt
from copyright liability under section
114(d)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act."
But clarification may have been the
last thing it provided.

perspective, the only transmissions which are
exempt under section 114(d)(1)(A) are those
made by an FCC-licensed broadcaster under
the terms of its license. In general, such
transmissions are over-the-air transmissions
made within the broadcaster's local service
area. Webcasts of AVFM radio signals are
not so limited and, therefore, do not fit the
statutory definition of a 'broadcast' transmis41
sion for purposes of the DPRA.

radio signal over the Internet, generally referred to as a
webcast, is subject to the copyright owner's public performance right, even when the transmission is made by

As noted above, the Copyright Office agreed with the
RIAA's interpretation, which it embodied in the Final
Rule. Following the issuance of the Final Rule, the NAB
filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District

an FCC-licensed broadcaster and is identical to an
36
over-the-air transmission."
According to the Copyright Office, "the dispute lies
with the definition of a 'broadcast transmission.'
Broadcasters argue that the pivotal element in the defi-

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking
to have the Copyright Office's action overturned. 4 2 The
next section explores the merits of that action, showing
186

m-si
how the assumptions and conclusions of the Copyright
Office (as influenced by the RIAA) failed to conform to
the path laid out by Congress in the DPRA.

sion as over-the-air broadcast, telecast over cable or
satellite, and modem or other telephone communication.
The Internet, it should be specifically noted, allows for
transmission... ."48

WHERE THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE WENT
WRONG
Arguably, in seeing why the Copyright Office and the
RIAA might have arrived at the wrong conclusion, one
need go no further than the text of the statute itself. In
the rulemaking, the Copyright Office initially decided
that "[t]he key to determining the scope of the exemption
is an understanding of the meaning of the term 'broadcast transmission.'

43

As it is, however, such an "under-

As such, there appears to be no

basis in the statutory text for the Copyright Office's
speculation that "Congress appears to have chosen these
words . . . as a way to circumscribe which actions the
entity may legally undertake within the scope of the section 114 exemption." 4 9 To the contrary, if a "transmission" can occur by numerous means, the exemption must
depend on the identity of the transmitter (an FCClicensed broadcaster) and the nonsubscription nature of
the transmission. In other words:

standing" might just start one word too late.
Section 114(d)(1)(A) exempts "nonsubscription broad-

[T]o the extent that a traditional radio station
in Denver or television station in Miami

cast transmissions." From the perspective of the NAB,
the inclusion of the term "nonsubscription" means a
great deal. If the exemption was limited to over-the-air

broadcasts programs that include performanc-

transmissions, as the RIAA and Office maintain, there

the transmission must be geared to the public

would be no need for the additional term, since the
notion of subscription has no application to such traditional transmissions. As Professor David Nimmer
observes, "[c]learly," the license that section 114 requires

at large rather than to individual subscribers,
and must be non-interactive. Note that even
if such sound recordings are broadcast wholly

for "subscription transmissions" is "inapplicable to 'traditional over-the-air broadcast transmissions,' which are
44
neither limited as to recipients nor subject to charge."
The only reason to include the subscription concept
would be if not only over-the-air, but also Internet "transmissions" by broadcasters were contemplated as being
within the exemption.

In other words, simultaneous

webcasts by a radio station would be exempt; however, if
that station started offering subscription (or interactive)
services, it would not be able to avail itself of the exemp45

tion for those new services.
Otherwise, if the statute
is interpreted as the RIAA suggests, "nonsubscription" is
mere surplusage. Of course, statutes are not to be so
46

interpreted.
Furthermore, the RIAA's principal textual argument-that the word "terrestrial" in section 114(j)(3) limits the definition of "broadcast transmission" to "overthe-air" transmissions-suffers from a similar flaw,
downplaying as it does the breadth of the word "transmission." Under section 101, "[t]o 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond
'4 7

the place from which they are sent.
Professor
Nimmer again provides a useful gloss, commenting that
transmission potentially includes "such forms of diffu-

es of sound recordings, that activity is exempt
from liability. To qualify for the exemption,

in digital format, they are still exempt
50
because of their nonsubscription character.
The Copyright Office (following the RIAA's lead) also
focused on another provision-the section 114(d)(1)(B)
exemption for "retransmission of a radio station's broadcast transmission."
Following the statutory construction principle that, whenever possible, different provisions of an act are to be harmonized, the Office found this
provision was inconsistent with the broadcasters' interpretation:
While it is clear that a broadcast transmission
is exempt, it is equally clear that a retransmission of a radio signal (though technically a
transmission) is exempt only under certain
circumstances. This fact alone undermines
the Broadcasters' assertion that any transmission made by an FCC-licensed broadcaster is
51
immediately and totally exempt.
The Copyright Office further rejected "the suggestion
that the retransmissions discussed in
section
114(d)(1)(B) refer only to those made by third parties and
not to simultaneous retransmissions made by the originating broadcaster," finding "[t]here is no such distinc52
tion set forth in the statute."
However, the text and logic of section 114(d)(1)(B) do
suggest that it is geared to situations where another

S MUL FFE

& C

TG RY R. NRO

provider picks up the broadcaster's radio signal and
retransmits it. For example, that subsection states in
part that exempt retransmissions of a radio station's

1978-that Congress "simply includ[e] sound recordings
within the public performance right" (a solution which
Nimmer says would improve the nation's trade bal-

broadcast transmission are, inter alia, those "that are..
. obtained by the retransmitter over the air."5 3 A radio
station that is simultaneously streaming its programming doesn't need to obtain its own signal over the air in

ance). 59 "But Congress decided to act differently," and
instead "added a new sixth right to the Copyright Act..
60
• limited to the domain of 'digital audio transmission'."

order to retransmit it over the Internet. Rather, the webcast is simply a simultaneous adjunct of the traditional
broadcast. Moreover, the legislative history also confirms that Congress had third parties in mind when it
"created the section 114(d)(1)(B) exemption because it
[was] aware that cable systems and other multichannel
programming distributors"-i.e., third parties-"often
offer retransmissions of non-subscription broadcast
54
transmissions to their customers."
Further attention to the legislative history of section
114 provides more support for a position contrary to that
adopted in the Final Rule.

By "focus[ing] ...on the

nature of the transmission and not the characterization
of the entity making the transmission," 55 the Copyright
Office and the RIAA give short shrift to Congress' historical treatment of broadcasters and the various expressions of legislative intent not to disturb that treatment.
For instance, when passing section 114, Congress plainly expressed its intention that "[tihis legislation should
do nothing to change or jeopardize the mutually beneficial economic relationship between the recording and
56
traditional broadcasting industries."
As the broadcasters argued in the rulemaking, the
RIAA "ignore [s] Congress' intent to construe the digital
performance right narrowly," further asserting that "it is
inconceivable that after refusing for decades to grant
copyright owners of sound recordings a sound recording
performance right, Congress 'intended to sweep within a
newly-created and narrowly-circumscribed performance
right broadcaster transmissions over the Internet of
their broadcast programming.' 5 7 Put differently, the
identity of the "entity making the transmission" was precisely what Congress had in mind in creating the subsection (d)(1)(A) exemption, and the very nature of the digital performance right legislation suggests that a sea of
change was not contemplated. As Professor Nimmer colorfully puts it, "[w]hen Congress decided to plug the historical anomaly under which sound recordings lacked
any performance right, it could have acted very simply.
58
Instead, it gave birth to a Frankenstein."
In 1991, the Copyright Office suggested-as it had in

"Notwithstanding the views of the Copyright Office and
the Patent and Trademark Office that it is appropriate to
create a comprehensive performance right for sound
recordings," Congress chose "to create a carefully crafted
and narrow performance right, applicable only to certain
digital transmissions of sound recordings." 6 1 In doing so,
it necessarily created a "resulting framework [that] is
62
frightfully complex."
Having examined just a part of the "frightful" complexity of the digital performance right, it is clear that
Congress was limiting its action to the most incremental
of steps. Instead of a "blanket public performance right"
in sound recordings, 63 Congress chose "a careful balancing of interests, reflecting the statutory and regulatory
requirements imposed on U.S. broadcasters, recording
interests, composers, and publishers, and the recognition
of the potential impact of new technologies on the recording industry."64 As Professor Nimmer puts it, this balancing resulted in "Congress' decision to immunize
65
broadcastersfrom the newly created rights....
Nevertheless, the RIAA pointed to "numerous citations in the legislative history which make it abundantly clear that Congress meant to protect traditional
over-the-air broadcast transmissions." 6 6 That's true, of
course, but the expressions of legislative intent indicate
that it was not only broadcasters' "over the air" transmissions that were being immunized. For instance, the
Senate Report says that "broadcasting and related transmissions" which posed no threat to the recorded music
67
market, are to be exempted.
Moreover, Congress' overriding, fundamental concern
was that the historical balance between broadcasters
and the recording industry not be disturbed. 68 No less
than its "over-the-air broadcasts," a station's simultaneous webcast is "available without subscription, do[es] not
rely on interactive delivery, and provide[s] a mix of entertainment and non-entertainment programming and
other public interest activities to local communities to
fulfill a condition of the broadcasters' license." 6 9 As one
commentator noted, "[b]ecause Congress has historically
been sympathetic to broadcasters' arguments that radio
play is a benefit to the recording industry, it might seem

m silogical to assume that the same benefit redounds to the
recording industry when radio broadcasters translate
70
their signal to a new medium."
Perhaps the most compelling argument made by the
RIAA is that "it would be illogical to allow broadcasters
to stream their AMIFM radio signal under an exemption
but impose copyright liability on a third party when it

from

which

to

originate

those

transmissions.

73

Furthermore, "not only are radio and television stations
exempt because of their analog broadcast format as of
1995, but even to the extent they may go to digital format in the future, they will continue to be exempt, unless
and until they enter the subscription or interactive marketplace."

74

retransmits the identical programming." 71 But here
again, the logic of the enactment must be read in light of
its history and narrowly crafted purpose; as the broad-

Nevertheless, the RIAA (and the Copyright Office)
further maintained, "Congress could not possibly have
meant to exempt anything other than over-the-air broad-

casters argued, the RIAA's interpretation:
would mean that radio broadcasters would
have to alter radically their programming

casts in the DPRA, because Congress had not even yet
considered transmissions of sound recordings over the
75
Internet and how they fit into the statutory scheme."

practices in order to fit the requirements of
the statutory license, negotiate voluntary
licenses to do what they already do

As stated by the House Managers' Report for the 1998
DMCA, when the DPRA was enacted, "Internet transmissions of music were not the focus of Congress' effort"
because "not enough was known about how nonsubscrip-

over-the-air, or cease streaming activities altogether. . . . [S]uch a harsh reading of the
statute flies in the face of the stated intent of
the DPRA because it would alter dramatically
the longstanding relationship between the
record industry and the broadcasters that
Congress meant to preserve; a relationship
which historically has had a beneficial and a
promotional effect on the sale of records ....
[T]he acknowledged benefits that flow from
the longstanding relationship between the
record industry and broadcasters are not lost
because a radio program is streamed over the
Internet. "If radio broadcasts are beneficial to
the record industry on a local scale due to the
public exposure afforded sound recordings
from their airplay, that same broadcasting
activity is all the more beneficial to the record
industry on a national or global scale due to
the even greater public exposure (leading to
increased record sales) that those recordings
72
will receive."

tion music services would evolve on the Internet or in
other digital media." 76 The Office found this "a critical
point, because the scope of the exemption did not change
when Congress amended section 114 in 1998 with the
passage of the DMCA.'' 77 The meaning of "nonsubscription broadcast transmission . . .remained unchanged
'
when Congress amended section 114 in 1998. 78
But does that militate in favor of not exempting webcasts by broadcasters?
Shouldn't we assume by this
inaction that Congress did not see the need to further
clarify that it was not intending to change the balance of
power between the recording industry and broadcasters,
as it expressly stated in 1995? After all, Congress itself
said the DMCA was "not intended to affect the exemption for nonsubscription broadcast transmissions" as it
previously existed. 7 9 Besides, in all events, "[t]here is a
presumption against the implied repeal or amendment of
any existing statutory provision"; such a change must be
clear and unambiguous. 80 There is no question that it
81
was neither here.

Indeed, in analyzing the definition of "nonsubscription
broadcast transmission" under Section 114(d)(1)(A) (as

Moreover, in enacting the DPRA, Congress was well
aware that "[t]he relevant technologies will continue to
advance." According to the House Report, "[t]he bill

amended by the DMCA), commentators concluded that
the statute did draw a distinction between radio stations
and "webcasters," and that a transmission by the former

[was] carefully drafted to accommodate foreseeable technological changes. However, to the extent that the lan-

would be exempted based on the fact it was "made by a
terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such." In the
words of one such commentator, "to make exempt

that both the rights and the exemptions and limitations

non-interactive, non-subscription transmissions over the
Internet, a webcaster would have to buy a radio station

guage of the bill [did] not precisely anticipate particular
technological changes, it [was] the committee's intention
created by the bill be interpreted in order to achieve their
intended purposes."8 2 As discussed above, the legislation's "intended purpose," was "to provide copyright hold-
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ers of sound recordings with the ability to control the distribution of their product" 8 3 where digital technology
presented a possible substitute for the record industry's
product. Just as importantly, Congress was not intending to "upset in any way the longstanding relationship

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
With traditional, over-the-air broadcasts, radio stations do not have to start paying license fees to rights
holders if they get a bigger transmitter or technology
allows their signal to reach more listeners. That much,
not even the RIAA will dispute. So why should it matter

between the record industry and broadcasters" 84-a
relationship which had long been found beneficial to the
distribution and sale of recorded products, and posed "no
threat to the distribution of sound recordings." 8 5 As the

if stations use the Internet to reach additional listeners?
The law shouldn't be interpreted to discourage radio stations from using new Internet technology to do the same
thing they're doing now-especially since Congress itself
expressly said it did not want to "[hamper] ...new technologies" or "impose new and unreasonable burdens" on
broadcasters. And make no mistake: industry observers

Senate Report succinctly stated, "[t]he underlying
rationale for creation of this limited right is grounded in
the way the market for prerecorded music has developed,
and the potential impact on that market posed by sub-

feel the Copyright Office's new rule "will likely force
many terrestrial broadcasters to abandon the streaming
of their music-oriented on-air programming." One such

scription and interactive services-but not by broadcast86
ing and related transmissions."
Of course, it also appears that the DMCA amendments were hastily added--"days, and perhaps hours"
before its passage, according to some reports-as the
result of negotiations between RIAA and the Digital

observer commented:
New royalty fees could amount to tens of millions of dollars and could cripple terrestrial

Media Association (DiMA). 8 7 "Alone among the major
copyright features of the [DMCA], this one crept in at the
last stage," and the legislative history "contain[s] no
mention of amendments to the [DPRA]."88 As some have

Radio's efforts to grow streaming initiatives.
The industry already struggles with an inability to profit from such streaming and the burden of additional fees likely will be too much
for many companies to justify streaming
92
expense.
Also, if radio station webcasters were subject to statu-

noted:
There is nothing in the language or history of
the DMCA to indicate that, after assiduously
preserving the mutually beneficial relation-

tory licensing, they "would be required to alter their original broadcast signal to the extent necessary to comply
with the DMCA's programming and interface restrictions, thus subjecting nonsubscription broadcast transmissions to the provisions of a statute from which they

ship between the record and radio industries,
Congress suddenly decided, without careful
consideration, to reverse course and alter that
relationship. To the contrary, Congress made
clear that it did not intend to alter the scope of

have been specifically exempted. It seems unlikely that
Congress, which has consistently protected and exempted broadcasters from the demands of sound recording
performance rights-holders, would have knowingly craft-

the exemption for nonsubscription broadcast
89
transmissions.
And indeed, according to the NAB, it had an "explicit
understanding with RIAA that none of the DMCA

ed such a Catch-22. ' '9 3 "In the face of this conundrum,"
94
broadcasters might well "forsake the Web" altogether."

amendments to the DPRA would in any way affect or
influence the existing dispute over whether the DPRA
imposed performance rights in sound recording liability
on radio stations that streamed their signals." 90 In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, the NAB's Mr. Fritts expressed his

Such a result would:
be the greatest cause for concern. If the ultimate effect of the webcasting license provisions is to inhibit the most natural participants from joining the fray at the cutting edge
of new music technologies, it might ensure
that the young webcasting industry never
gains sufficient strength to present significant

dismay that the RIAA was "now arguing to the Copyright
Office (in breach of that agreement) that the DMCA
amendment did somehow strengthen their argument
that radio stations are subject to performance rights in
91
sound recordings for streaming."

competition as an alternative distribution
95
medium.
At least at this stage, radio station webcasting does
190

m: siC
little more than give the station's current listeners the
option of tuning in on the Internet, perhaps when they
are in an office or out of town. As such, currently "much
of the value of the Internet transmission comes from the
ability to retain listener loyalty, from both those within

via the Internet), but performances of recorded music, whether by on-demand interactive
services, or by webcasting, are likely to displace acquisition of retention copies. This is

the local community served by the over-the-air transmis-

because having the recorded performance is
likely to matter less to consumers than hear-

sion and those 'who are traveling away from their home
listening areas."'96 On the other hand, an Internet-only

ing it, and the digital environment may well
make it as easy for the user to hear the

webcaster, catering to a national or global audience,
stands on a different footing than a root-bound FCC
licensee, who must comply with FCC regulations and
"public interest" requirements, 9 7 and whose advertising
and promotions are directed to a local audience. As the
NAB testified before the House Judiciary Committee:

desired performance via transmission as to
play her own copy of it. 10 0
As the Copyright Office itself acknowledges, when
Congress drafted the DPRA it "understood that it could
not predict how technology would develop or how it
would alter the ways in which sound recordings were

[T]he absence of the exemption would leave
the broadcaster significantly disadvantaged in
relation to Internet-only webcasters, who are

performed or distributed."10

able to program their transmissions for their
Internet audience, free from the constraints

right, rather than granting a simple, broad, and allencompassing performance right in sound recordings.
The labyrinthine and cautious nature of section 114

98

Congress.
In other words, contrary to the RIAA's and the
Copyright Office's assessment, there are valid
reasons for treating traditional broadcasters differently from webcasters at this stage. In addition to the reasons discussed above, it is simply
too early in the game to know how this technology will ultimately affect the market. Will webcasting become the industry standard for music
transmissions, leaving radio broadcasting to
fade away? Or will webcasts remain simply an
adjunct to traditional broadcasting?
And for
that matter, given all those Napster headlines,

bespeaks a limited Congressional intent, not one that
would permanently and radically alter the historical
relationship between
simply too early in the
broadcasters
and

is
gainle to know how this technology
Win ultimately affect the market.
webcasting become the indusWl
try standard for music transmisSion,s, leaving radio broadcasting to

fade away? Or will webcasts
re am simply an adjunct to traditionl al broadcasting? And for that
mat ter, given all those Napster
he lines, what will become of
recc)rdedmusic itself?

what will become of recorded music itself? For instance,
Professor Ginsburg observes that the 1998 DMCA
amendments "[mark] an important shift in the economics of sound recordings

...

."99

She writes:

[lB]efore these amendments, sound recording
artists and producers derived a return only
from sales of phonorecords. Radio broadcasts

These assorted open ques-

tions may be one reason why Congress adopted a "go
slow," incremental approach to the digital performance

imposed by an FCC license or the need to
structure programming to satisfy the needs of
their over-the-air audience. Such a result was
not, and could not have been, intended by

1

rights holders.
What
Congress
was
saying,
in
essence, was "let's
wait and see." The
recording industry
may not like that
message any more
than it has liked the
traditional
Congressional
antipathy
toward

granting copyright protections to sound recordings; it
may also have legitimate concerns about the future of
recorded music, especially in the face of such antipathy.
But at least at this stage, the proper response to the message, the proper answer to the concerns, does not lie in
squelching broadcasters' forays on the Internet with an
overreaching reading of the digital performance right.

of the sound recordings, albeit uncompensated, in effect advertised the recordings, stimu-

When the RIAA advocates such a "solution"-and worse
yet, when the Copyright Office accepts it-they are both

lating sales. In the digital environment, sales

jumping the gun.

of phonorecords may well persist (including

6

S

MU LFFE&G

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

Pub. L. No. 92-140, §§ 1(a)-(e), 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (cur-

20

4 Fritts Statement, supra note 1, at 141.

21

17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(5) (1995).

22

17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1995).

23

17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1995).

24

17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1995).

25

17 U.S.C. § 1140)(3) (1995).

5 See David W. Wittenstein

& M. Lorrane Ford, The
Webcasting Wars, J. Internet L. (Feb. 1999), at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil-feb992.html
("Congress has historically been sympathetic to broadcasters' arguments that radio play is a benefit to the
recording industry" and "has consistently protected and
exempted broadcasters from the demands of sound
recording performance-right holders").

26

Id.

Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Librarian of Cong.,
176 F. 3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-274

(1995), 1995 WL 606862

[hereinafter 1995 House Report].
9 Pub. L. No. 104-39, §§ 1-6, 109 Stat. 336, 344, 348-49
(1995) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101, amended by
Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379, 114 Stat. 1444, §§ 106, 111,
114-15, 119, 801-03 (1995)).
10 Id.
11 Id.; See also S. Rep. No. 104-128, at 13 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 360 [hereinafter 1995
Senate Report].
RealNetworks.

Inc.

v.

Streambox.

Inc.,

No.

2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
18, 2000).

27

28

Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the
"Digital Millennium", 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 137,
167 (Spr. 1999) (emphasis in original).
14

"The new version of the sound recording public per-

formance right retains the three-tier structure of the
1995 amendments, but substantially narrows the category of transmissions that are wholly exempted from the
right. Where this category had included nonsubscription
digital transmissions in general, and hence on its face

15 See Complaint of National Ass'n of Broadcasters at
National Ass'n of Broadcasters

Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition

of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77292, 77293-94 (Dec. 11,
2000) [hereinafter Final Rule].

13 Fritts Statement, supra note 1, at 141.

27-29,

17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (1995). The statute defines

"interactive service" as "one that enables a member of
the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not
as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of
the recipient." 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (1995). The statute
clarifies that merely allowing D.J.s to play requests does
not make a service "interactive": "The ability of individuals to request that particular sound recordings be performed for reception by the public at large, or in the case
of a subscription service, by all subscribers of the service, does not make a service interactive, if the programming on each channel of the service does not substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed
within 1 hour of the request or at a time designated by
either the transmitting entity or the individual making
such request. If an entity offers both interactive and
noninteractive services (either concurrently or at different times), the noninteractive component shall not be
treated as part of an interactive service." Id.

7

12

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995), amended by Work Made for

Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-379, 114 Stat. 1444.

3 See 17 U.S.C. §106.

8

See also Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 167 ("The

1995 amendments to the Copyright Act established a
three-tier system. Nonsubscription digital audio transmissions were treated as analog radio transmissions had
been, that is, recording artists and producers enjoyed
neither control nor compensation.")

rent version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 116, 401-02, 405
(1995)).

6

Ro

Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. 00 Civ. 2330 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar.
27, 2000).

1 Copyrighted Webcast Programming on the Internet:
on Courts and
the Subcomm.
Before
Hearing
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 140 (2000) (statement of Edward 0. Fritts,
of
Association
National
CEO,
and
President
Broadcasters) [hereinafter Fritts Statement] (citing
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of
Justice. House Comm. on the Judiciary. Performance
Rights in Sound Recordings 28-58 (Comm. Print 1978),
prepared by Register of Copyrights for congressional
consideration of performance right in sound recordings
between 1925 and 1977).
2

EG -RYR.N

v. Recording
192

exempted most webcasting, this category now is limited
to
'nonsubscription
broadcast
transmission[s] .'
Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 168.

48 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 196.

29 37 C.F.R. § 201.35(a) (2000).

49 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77298 (emphasis added).

30 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77292.

50 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 202.

31 37 C.F.R. § 201.35(b)(2) (2000).

51 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77298 (citing 2A Norman

32

194.

J. Singer Statutory Construction § 46.05 (6th ed. 2000)).

Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77292.

52 Id. at 77299.
Wittenstein
&
Ford, supra
note
5,
at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/j ournal/jil-feb99_2 .html.
33

34 Id. at fn. 26.
35 See Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77293. This group
included the Digital Media Association (DiMA), which
represented Internet-only "webcasters."
36 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77295-96.

53 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (1995).
54 1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 19. See also
Wittenstein
&
Ford,
supra
note
5,
at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil-feb99 2.html
(Section 114(d)(1)(B) was "specifically intended to provide exemptions for cable systems and other multichannel programmers (such as direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) systems) that offer retransmissions of nonsubscription radio broadcasts to their customers.")

37 Id. at 77297.
38 Id. (citing 1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15).

55 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77297.
56 1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15.

39 Id. at 77296; 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3) (1995).
57 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77297.
40 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77297.
58 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 189.
41 Id.
42

See National Ass'n of Broadcasters

v. Recording

Indus. Ass'n of Am., (E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 25, 2001).

59 Id. at 190 & fns. 9, 11; 1995 Senate Report, supra note
11, at 11 (citing Register of Copyright, Report on
Copyright Implications of Digital Audio Transmission
Services (Oct. 1991)).

43 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77298.
60 Id.

44 David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I: On the
Absurd Complexity of the Digital Audio Transmission
Right, 7 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 189, 210 (Spring 2000).

at 191 (emphasis added).

61

1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 13.

62

Nimmer, supra note 44, at 191.

See also Wittenstein

45 Id. at 246-47 ("[I]f a nonsubscription entity, such as a
radio station, 'chooses to offer an interactive service as a
separate business, or only during certain hours of the
day, that decision does not affect the exempt status of
any component of the entity's business that does not
offer an interactive service."') (quoting 1995 House
Report at 25-26).

&
Ford,
supra
note
5,
at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil-feb99_2.html
("to say that the legislation is complex is an understatement. 'The Internal Revenue Code . . . is complex; [this
legislation] is . . . incomprehensible') (quoting Lionel S.
Sobel, A New Music Law for the Age of Digital
Technology, 17 Ent. L. Rep. 3 (Nov. 1995)).

46 See e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145,
116 S.Ct. 501, 507 (1995); United States v. Handy, 761
F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A statute should be
construed so as to avoid making any word superfluous.").

63

47 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995), amended by Work Made for
Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-379, 114 Stat. 1444 (emphasis added). "Although
the current Act defines 'transmit' (as well as 'transmission program'), it contained at enactment no general definition for 'transmission."' Nimmer, supra note 44, at

66 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77297.

Nimmer, supra note 44, at 265 n.12.

64 1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15-16.
65 Nimmer, supra note 44, at fn. 12 (emphasis added).

67

1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 15, 22 (empha-

sis added).
68 See Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77297 (citing 1995

S-AMUEL F FE

& G EG iY R. N FR

House Report, supra note 8, at 13); 1995 Senate Report,
supra note 11, at 19.
Id.

70

Wittenstein & Ford, supra note 5.

71

Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77300.

72

Id.

Id.

92 Mark Bingaman, Government Says Terrestrial Radio
Must Pay Fees, Streaming Magazine (Dec. 8, 2000), at
http://www.streamingmagazine.net (visited March 20,
2001).

(citing 1995 House Report, supra note 8, at 13).

69

91

Wittenstein
&
Ford,
supra note
5,
at
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil-feb992.html.
93

94

Id.

73 Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and

Digital Music Delivery, 20 Ent. L. Rptr. 4 (Sept. 1998)
(emphasis added).

95 Id.
96

74 2 David Nimmer. Nimmer on Copyright § 8.21 n. 49.
75 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77296.
Id.

76

(citing

Comm.

H.R.

on

Judiciary

the

Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 51 (Comm.
Print 1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Report].
77 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77296.
78 Id.

See IA Norman J. Singer, Statutory Construction §
22.30, 267 (5th ed. 1993).
80

81

See

Wittenstein

&

Ford,

supra

note

5,

at

http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil_feb99_2.html.
82

1995 House Report, supra note 8.

83

Id.

84

Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77295.

85

1995 House Report, supra note 8.

86

1995 Senate Report, supra note 11, at 17.

See Kohn, supra note 73. See also Ginsburg, supra
note 14, at 166-68 ("A last-minute addition to the DMCA
inserted extremely detailed provisions amending the ...
[DPRA], as the result of "negotiations between copyright
.");
owners and digital transmission services ....
at
5,
note
supra
Ford,
&
Wittenstein
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/j ournal/jil-feb992.html
(describing the "DMCA webcasting provisions" as "a
negotiated compromise between the RIAA and the webcasting industry .... ").
87

88 2 Nimmer, supra note 74, at § 8.21 n. 69.
89 Fritts Statement, supra note 1.
90

Id.

Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77301 (quoting one

group of broadcasters' reply to the Copyright Office's
March 16, 2000 "notice of proposed rulemaking ... seeking comment on whether the transmission of an AM/FM
radio broadcast signal over the Internet by the broadcaster that originates the AM/FM signal is exempt from
copyright liability under the exemption to the digital
performance right in sound recordings set forth in section 114 of the Copyright Act, title 17 of the United
States Code."). See also Kurt Hanson, What Don't We
Yet Know About Radio and the Internet, RAIN: Radio
And Internet Newsletter (May 15, 2000), at <http://
www.kurthanson.com/ HTM-RAIN/NewsArchives/May00/051500.htm> (visited March 20, 2001) ("Some office
workers who have reception problems-or who for whatever reason don't have a radio at work-may enjoy listening to their favorite local station via the Internet.
Some people who've moved to a new city may enjoy listening to the radio stations from their old hometown
(including sports broadcasts).")
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309-10 (1991). FCC regulations
impose a host of requirements on the content of stations'
broadcasts with which Internet-only webcasters need
not comply. See e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999) (identification of program sponsors); id. § 73.1920 (1999) (station must provide person opportunity to respond to onair personal attack on issue of public importance); id. §
73.3526(e)(12) (1999) (requiring quarterly report of station's programming on community issues).
97

98

Fritts Statement, supra note 1.

99 Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 169-70.
100 Id.
101 Final Rule, supra note 27, at 77301.

